Whether lessons are learned by the security services should be a matter for democratic debate
The final report of the public inquiry into the Manchester Arena attack in May 2017, which left 22 people dead, offers revealing insights into how the bomber, Salman Abedi, ended up as a violent jihadist; and how the security services lost chances to prevent him from carrying out the deadly blast. Sir John Saunders, the inquiry’s chairman, paints a quietly devastating portrait of wrong calls and serious misjudgments. The conclusion of the 226-page report is that there had been a “significant missed opportunity” by MI5 that might have stopped the carnage. Sir John found it had failed to act on two key pieces of intelligence, rejecting earlier claims by the agency that the information was related to “non‑terrorist criminality”. The apology from MI5’s director general, Ken McCallum, was necessary. The agency had to acknowledge its mistake. But it does not ease the pain felt by bereaved families.
MI5’s defence of the realm in the modern age has been as a counter-terrorist agency. Until 1989, it operated in a legal and political grey area, without statutory authority. The report shows that even today, the service largely runs under its own rules, operating with the trust of senior British politicians – themselves a small group. Sir John’s report is not the whole picture. Another document, which covers evidence heard in private, will never be made public on the grounds of national security. This is likely to raise more unanswered questions. A lawyer for the families could have signed the Official Secrets Act and been given access to a redacted version of this file. It seems wrong that this did not happen. That might have helped those mourning loved ones find some closure.
