Putin himself may be out of reach, but weakening the oligarchs and the economy is still an important weapon
Shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine, in February, dozens of countries responded with coordinated sanctions against the aggressor. They had three aims: to cripple the Russian economy by limiting the ability of banks to access dollars and the US financial system; to curtail exports of hi-tech goods and services to reduce Russia’s ability to fight the war; and to target allies of the Kremlin and businesses. This unprecedented economic coercion has not been able to obliterate the Kremlin’s resolve for war or its economic capability. Nor have the sanctions crushed Russia’s standard of living. But look closely, and you will see that they are succeeding in systematically crippling the country, and remain necessary in order to bring the war to an end.
Russia’s isolation now that its supply chains are decimated, along with the mass exodus of an estimated 1,000 foreign firms, threatens its future growth and power projection. By limiting Russian imports, export controls have created a trade surplus. High energy prices have also raised demand for rubles. As a result, the ruble has sharply appreciated in value against the dollar.
Carla Norrlöf is a professor of political science at the University of Toronto
