Analysis only makes sense in football when used by those who understand the limits of what statistics can tell you
England won the Second Test against South Africa comfortably enough, but there was a frustrating spell before tea on the first day as Kagiso Rabada and Anrich Nortje added 35 for the ninth wicket. Having bowled relatively full earlier in the day, England switched to a short-pitched attack to no great effect. Notably it was a full-pitched ball from Ollie Robinson after tea that delivered the breakthrough as Nortje was lbw.
So why had England changed approach? Perhaps they had been swayed by the Test against India at Lord’s when they had successfully bounced out the tail, or perhaps it was a reaction to the nature of this season’s Dukes cricket balls which have been losing menace more quickly than usual, demanding something different from the bowler. But there was also, seemingly, data that the South Africa tail was susceptible to short-pitched bowling. The problem is that if every ball is short-pitched, batters come to expect it and can set for it; far more dangerous is the surprise short-pitched ball.
